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 In media history, there exists a perpetual cycle in which humanity’s innovation of 
communication technology shapes world culture and political climate, eventually resulting in 
humanity’s delayed response to these changes. Using this framework, this paper addresses the 
recent innovations of the social media era and the spread of online communication in regards to 
their impact on behavioral conditioning, democracy, and generally how people process 
information. The discussion takes a nuanced stance between two popular ways of imagining 
social media’s effect on the world: arguing for both an oppressive, authoritarian reality, likened 
to Orwell’s 1984, and a senseless, over-stimulated one, likened to Huxley’s Brave New World.  
 First, the paper addresses themes in human reasoning that have contributed to the success 
of social media as well as the ways social media exploits and reinforces certain aspects of human 
behavior. The discussion then turns to the politicization of social media and the ways society has 
used current media technology to shape political climates and additionally frame news, both 
internationally and domestically. Lastly, the paper addresses the deviance of social media 
platforms into problematic uses, including the empowerment of authoritarian regimes and the 
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 Notions of truth elusively slip through humanity’s fingers, only to fall once more in the 
palm below, creating an eternal dialectic in which people continually change how to discover, 
disseminate, and utilize truth. The pursuit of reality and the desire to control narratives of history 
drive humanity forward into this struggle to determine what words the world utters and who will 
hear them. Though ironic, the most significant strides in this dialectic often provoke the most 
fleeting perceptions of truth. To understand truth, one must understand how society 
communicates. Through the respective ways a public engages in discourse and news reaches an 
audience—every medium of communication gives a new dimension of life to the messages that it 
bears. As history shifts from oral to written, and from written to digital, there occurs not only 
changes in how people create and disseminate information, but how they process and think about 
the information, how it affects people emotionally and compels them beyond the literal meaning 
of words. As global cultures shift and the pendulum of history swings in its new trajectory, the 
world often focuses on what people are saying and for what purpose but rarely asks, “how are 
they saying it?” In answering this question, the world witnesses how truth does not lie outside of 
humanity, as something to grasp, but rather originates from within humanity itself as a product of 
culture and innovation—not the purpose of culture and innovation. By discussing the modern 
shift of communication onto digital mediums, the internet, and social media platforms, this paper 
addresses how the world has again changed communication, thus shaping truth itself, and how 
humanity has failed to adequately respond.  
 In short, social media has altered the ways in which the world communicates, destroying 
notions of truth, civil discourse, and democracy in the process. The term “social media” 
represents platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram by which users share, post, and 
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receive content, building an online community and social network that warrants providing 
personal information, feedback, and communication. Additionally, this includes websites such as 
YouTube which allow users to share content openly to the website’s entire, mass audience and 
platforms such as GroupMe which provide group messaging services but with the added feature 
of reacting to or liking specific messages. Across the spectrum of online communication 
platforms, several common features persist: the emphasis of visual, succinct bits of information, 
encouraged social affiliation, and the digital trail of user participation. While the innovation of 
communicating online intended to connect the world and positively impact global opportunities, 
these mediums have skewed the way society effectively communicates and processes 
information.  
Social media exploits the flaws in human reasoning that prioritize fast-paced, surface-
level content over a deep understanding of issues and largely reduces all shared content to 
provocative, visual fragments of a story. These platforms encourage users to disregard the 
contexts, nuances, and compromises of an issue, instead choosing to support an easily 
identifiable, polarizing stance and base its credibility on premises of social affiliation: what 
person shared the content and does their online network like and affirm them. As the world 
opens up to the dangers of addictive, sensational mediums of digital communication, there exists 
rampant opportunities for companies, governments, movements, and campaigns to take 
advantage of these platforms and their users. As summarized by media historian and author Siva 
Vaidhyanathan;  
“If you wanted to build a machine that would distribute propaganda to millions of people, 
distract them from important issues, energize hatred and bigotry, erode social trust, 
undermine journalism, foster doubts about science, and engage in massive surveillance 
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all at once, you would make something a lot like Facebook.” (Vaidhyanathan, 
Siva. Antisocial Media How Facebook Disconnects Us and Undermines Democracy. 
[New York: Oxford University Press: 2018], 19.) 
However, the flaws and difficulties that have accompanied the creation, success, and evolution of 
social media present a more complex web of media history and culture.  
This paper intends to provide a context of media theory and human reasoning that 
explains why mediums of communication regularly and heavily impact humanity, but also 
reveals how social media supersedes any prior media innovation and presents alarmingly 
unparalleled changes in human history. By discussing the exploitation of humanity, the 
disruption of geopolitical climates, the empowerment of authoritarianism, and the 
encouragement of informational chaos, the following exposition seeks to clarify a central reality: 
that while global, public discourse continues to occur more frequently via social media 
platforms, the world loses its grasp on truth and stability. Amidst a sea of case studies, media 
research projects, and discussions of dystopian possibilities, the subject often takes a narrow 
angle and corners the argument towards a focus on either social media’s encouragement of 
oppression or invocation of mindlessness. Instead, this paper takes a nuanced stance apart from 
authors such as Siva Vaidhyanathan and Neil Postman, arguing for the interdependent 
relationship between oppression and desensitization that exists within social media. Additionally, 
this discussion draws on a wide range of research and case studies, originally conducted by 
authors largely for the purpose of niche hypotheses, to tangibly connect numerous aspects of the 
technology’s harmful nature to the roots of human reasoning and culture. In staking 
dichotomous, middle-ground and broadening the contributions of individual research, this paper 
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creates a broader vision—one that quickly and effectively presents the gravity of humanity’s 
current situation.  
1. How to Frame Media 
Dystopia Dichotomy and Media Theory 
 Before launching into detailed discussion of today’s social media platforms, one must 
first consider the theories and mindsets with which scholars have analyzed and approached the 
evolution of media and technology in order to better contextualize the modern, media 
environment. The conversation often revolves around a central dichotomy—between the 
totalitarian future as portrayed in George Orwell’s novel 1984 and the deadened, senseless one in 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. Society seems to turn over in its oxymoronic state, 
switching from a belief that current media, surveillance, regulation, and government interference 
will soon result in the rise of an ultimate, authoritarian oppression to the belief that media will 
invite over-stimulation and instant gratification to prey on a numbed, apathetic world. However, 
while many attribute their theories and visions of media to the fulfillment of one specific future, 
ultimately there exists a seemingly paradoxical, but frightening middle ground in which the 
world experiences both threats of brutal totalitarianism and self-sedated, dispassionate 
existence—brought by the rise of social media.  
In the book Amusing Ourselves to Death, Neil Postman addresses television 
entertainment in the 1990’s, supporting the postulation of Huxley’s future over that of Orwell’s. 
He argues that the rise of entertainment media has changed the way people engage information 
and communication, reducing society’s ability to navigate discourse and instead expect shallow, 
	 9	
convenient sound-bites of information.1 The true danger lies not within brutality itself, but the 
ability to ignore brutality and the inability to address problems—the difference between burning 
books and losing the desire to read them entirely.2 With each innovative mode of 
communication—from the printing press to the internet—one must not only consider the changes 
in what information is now communicated, but how information is communicated and its long-
term, cultural effects on civil engagement and public discourse. “Every technology has a 
philosophy which is given expression in how the technology makes people use their minds, in 
what it makes us do with our bodies, in how it codifies the world, in which of our senses it 
amplifies, in which of our emotional and intellectual tendencies it disregards.”3  
This view of media, driving culture forward and shaping human modes of pedagogy and 
communication, represents the concept of technological determinism. In 1964, Marshall 
McLuhan—a major proponent of this theory—famously summarized the philosophy behind it by 
coining the phrase “the medium is the message.” Theorists such as Postman and McLuhan 
establish a simple line of causation in which technology and innovation force society to adjust 
and adapt, creating social change, influencing the human mind, and shaping society in the 
process.4 In many ways, this framework largely applies to the discussion of social media, as 
Facebook and other current platforms transform both the medium and message of modern 
                                                
1 Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Showbusiness. 
(London: Methuen: 2007). 
 
2 Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 23. 
 
3 Neil Postman, Five Things We Need to Know About Technological Change (Denver, CO: 
March 28: 1998) 1. 
 
4 Thomas Hauer, “Education, Technological Determinism And New Media” in INTED2017 
Proceedings, (2017), 1. 
	 10	
communication, creating new models of global audiences, communities, relationships, news 
sources, and movements. Conversation about social media needs to address how these platforms 
have leapt beyond the boundaries of any previous media or communication outlet and catalyzed 
historical, psychological and social change, leaving society to play catch up and pick up the 
pieces in their wake.  
The other, but subtler and more dangerous aspect of deterministic technology lies in what 
Postman deems the “mythical” quality of media. In this technological context, the word “myth” 
refers to the state in which an innovation tends to become integrated so deeply over time until 
considered “God-given, as if they were a part of the natural order of things.”5 As in the case of 
televisions becoming central focal points in a home, cars becoming an expected mode of 
transportation, or even the use of written language, technologies often lose any element of 
surprise or fascination and become an unchallenged, unquestioned part of reality. Postman’s 
theory thus frames social media in a precarious position, largely normalized and expected, but 
not yet unchallenged to the extent of the television or car. This represents a critical moment for a 
society teetering between dystopian realities—the opportunity to begin breaking habits, to 
question and regulate a media system before it becomes dangerously unalterable as a fixture in 
human history. However, the world does not exist solely as a technologically determined plot-
line, fated to chase and conform to innovation until reaching an unrecognizably skewed future. 
Technological determinism merely falls on one end of a spectrum, sitting across from the 
element of human causality which accounts for the complete picture, providing another 
dichotomy with which to frame conversation of media.  
Media and Human Behavior 
                                                
5 Postman, Five Things, 4-5. 
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 While technology remains a force in cultural evolution, culture and the human mind forge 
technology and account for the dogged pursuit of innovation to begin with, blurring these 
elements into a symbiotic relationship: essentially between the human mind and the influence of 
its own thoughts. Therefore, one must consider why social media is so successful, what aspects 
of human nature have brought about its creation, and how does humanity itself fuel social 
media’s influence over society. The effectiveness of social media platforms largely boils down to 
its addictive and visual nature: the entire system subsists on an endless cycle of images and 
videos, likes and comments, emotional reactions, and shallow information. Like opening the 
refrigerator time-after-time, knowing the contents have not changed significantly, one hopes 
endlessly for something to fulfill their appetite. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, GroupMe, 
and Instagram beg its users to post content, comment on other posts, or tag people in content and 
then continually hover, revisiting the sites to see how their audience has received and responded 
to the message. Facebook lowers the transactional costs of maintaining relationships and users’ 
attention, synthesizing friends into easily digestible displays of photos and using algorithms to 
curate media feeds of content based on relevance, number of reactions, and structured 
interactions.6 This ultimately reduces human interaction with social media to a state of behavior 
modification, best explained by the psychologist B. F. Skinner’s theory of “operant 
conditioning.” 
 Operant conditioning refers to the process of learning by receiving punishments and 
rewards in response to behavior. Skinner created an experiment, known as a “Skinner Box,” in 
which a rat was placed inside a box that contained a lever, the lever when activated would cause 
                                                
6 Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 33. 
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a pellet of food to drop into the container, and Skinner would change the degree at which the 
lever correlated to the dropping of a pellet.7 The experiment began by reaffirming the theory that 
behavior followed by positive consequences is likely to be repeated while behavior followed by 
negative consequences is less likely to be repeated, but broadened further to test a new aspect of 
operant conditioning. Skinner tested the theory that behavior followed by reinforcement tends to 
be repeated, while behavior that is not followed by any reinforcement, positive or negative, tends 
to die out. Using the lever and food pellets, Skinner tested different schedules of reinforcement—
varying the intervals at which the pull of the lever would go with or without a pellet. The results 
reveal a spectrum between what Skinner refers to as “continuous reinforcement” in which every 
lever pull is met with the immediate delivery of a pellet and “variable ratio reinforcement” in 
which the behavior of lever pulling is reinforced with a pellet drop after an unpredictable number 
of attempts. For continuous reinforcement, the rat can reliably trust in the line of causation and 
thus the rate at which it pulls the lever is slow, only accounting for the exact moments it feels 
hungry, and the rate at which the rat will stop pulling the lever if it stops yielding a reward of 
pellets is fast, due to the reliability of its correlation. However, in the case of variable ratio 
reinforcement, the rate at which the rat pulls the lever is almost constant, regardless of whether it 
needs to eat or not, to make sure it eventually gets food and the rate at which the rat will stop 
pulling the lever in response to no pellets is incredibly slow due to hope in eventual reward. The 
trick to social media’s success lies in variable ratio reinforcement—the secret to trapping 
consumers in a habitual cycle of opening applications parallels the method Skinner and even 
casinos use to keep their subjects pulling the lever.  
                                                
7 B.F. Skinner, The Behavior of Organisms: an Experimental Analysis, (Acton, MA: Copley Pub. 
Group: 1991). 
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 Author and internet activist, Cory Doctorow, presents the first strong correlation between 
Facebook and Skinner’s box, stating that the platform creates a system in which further 
engagement and disclosure of information represents the lever while social response and 
community represents the pellet.8 Each user builds a box of friends and family, photo albums, 
biographical information, interests, and posts, pulling a lever that may yield comments, likes, and 
engagement in return or nothing at all. Every day, new posts go unpredictably viral, incurring 
thousands of emotional reactions and comments, while the majority of content falls into a void 
that garners few responses and little social recognition. Platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram condition their users to over-share and constantly perform cursory checks, not 
knowing when a reward will come next, but remaining hopeful enough to keep them from 
stopping. “The more you embroider the account of your life, the more you disclose about your 
personal life, the more reinforcement—intermittent reinforcement—you get about your life,” 
giving companies like Facebook the information they crave and receiving sensationalized, 
shallow content in return.9 Society’s way of communicating and receiving information has begun 
to resemble the addictive, habit-forming activity of eating junk food—the endless consumption 
of small, savory bites without ever achieving fulfillment until you have lost track of 
consumption. In his book Anti-Social Media, Siva Vaidhyanathan argues that;  
“Facebook engages us like a bag of chips. It offers frequent, low-level pleasures. It rarely 
engages our critical faculties with the sort of depth that demands conscious articulation of 
the experience. We might turn to Facebook in a moment of boredom and look up an hour 
                                                
8 Cory Doctorow, “TedxObserver.” Filmed in March 2011 in UK. TED Video. 
 
9 Doctorow, TedxObserver. 
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later, wondering where that hour went and why we spent it on an experience so 
unremarkable yet not unpleasant.”10 
In the same way that food chemists design junk food to provide a savory taste and light density 
so that its consumers continue to eat without ever feeling satiated, Facebook creates an 
environment that is pleasurable without fully satisfying a need—deemed “vanishing caloric 
density” by the food industry.11 Social media successfully combines the most addictive, 
behavior-shaping qualities found in gambling and potato chip consumption, curating an 
experience that resembles the mindlessly pleasurable reality of Brave New World.  
 The second trick to social media lies in its visual nature, in the way platforms 
communicate heavily through the use of photos, videos, GIFs, and the phenomenon of memes. 
Photography and videography, as described by Susan Sontag’s On Photography, have 
revolutionized how information is communicated and how people perceive the world. Photos 
have the ability to suspend moments out of time and out of context, representing a reality 
believed to be more credible and objectively truthful than other mediums while not actually 
delivering the plot or narrative of the captured experience.12 Wielding an emphasis of perceived 
objectivity and emotional argument, as opposed to an explanatory one, photographs monopolize 
peoples’ attention, sensationalize content, and draw attention away from the full context—all 
things achieved by social media platforms as well. It makes sense then that the most popular 
platforms consist of rolling pages and news feeds filled with photographs and  
                                                
10 Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 34. 
 
11 Michael Moss, “The Extraordinary Science of Addictive Junk Food,” The New York Times, 
February 20, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/magazine/the-extraordinary-science-
of-junk-food.html  
 
12 Susan Sontag, Susan Sontag on Photography. (London: Allen Lane: 1978), 67. 
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thumbnails of videos and links. In order to draw relevance and engagement, articles, links, 
videos, events, memories, stories, and documented moments in peoples’ lives all focus on 
providing an emphasized photo with a secondary title or caption, transforming every piece of 
information into a billboard-like advertisement. 
 Social media provides a steady stream of decontextualized information in the form of 
photographs and images, sparking reaction, emotions, and the desire to comment or share, but 
rarely a deep understanding or discussion of the actual content.13 These platforms even manage 
to take the already distant nature of photographs and further remove meaning through sheer 
desensitization, exposing a global audience to endless depictions of tragedy, beauty, violence, 
entertainment, and historical moments until little significance remains intact. Additionally, 
Sontag argues that photography transitioned from art into a practice of amusement, providing “a 
way of certifying experience… a way of refusing it—by limiting experience to a search for the 
photogenic, by converting experience into an image, a souvenir.”14 Photography has become a 
way not only to perceive reality, but to invent it entirely—to relive the past, reframe the present, 
and express participation in something and the experience of life. People like Sontag have 
identified the nature of photography and its cultural impact decades before the invention of social 
media, but these platforms have now revolutionized the medium. The partnership between 
addictive news feeds and blurring streams of images results in the pinnacle of decontextualized, 
‘potato chip quality’ information that convinces people they know of and participated in 
countless things while the depth of this knowledge and experience remains shallow.  
The Social-Political Agenda  
                                                
13 Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 43. 
 
14  Sontag, On Photography, 15. 
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 Following the concepts that communication drives cultural change primarily through the 
medium rather than message and that social media actively shapes human behavior, society must  
consider the way these platforms have also altered peoples’ perceived attribution of priority and 
importance to information—changing what matters about the message by changing how it is 
delivered. Social media has made information social, adding an aspect of affiliation and 
community to every piece of content. The effects of making information social drastically shifts 
the way an audience perceives it, drawing priority away from actual understanding of content, as 
social media finds its key to success in this curated manipulation. In Anti-Social Media, 
Vaidhyanathan discusses Aristotle’s philosophy on friendship and his view of humanity’s core, 
political nature, stating that while social media originates from a place for fostering relationships 
and interactions—it inevitably leads to political, tribal performances of affiliation.15 Believing 
humans to be “political animals,” Aristotle claimed friendship to be political as well. Humanity’s 
desire to establish deep friendships, exert power, socialize and collaborate ultimately creates a 
system in which justice, affiliation, and politics emerge and thus the creation of society, or “the 
polis.”16 When discussing social media and the ways people utilize its platforms, it becomes 
necessary to understand the political nature of communication and how this form of media 
aggressively fosters it in every message, post, and interaction. “We share content regardless of its 
truth value or its educational value because of what it says about each of us,” focusing primarily 
on the ways content expresses membership and affiliation in order to generate social capital and 
a coordinated self-image.17 Scrolling through the comments on articles, links, viral posts, or even 
                                                
15 Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 49. 
 
16 Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 49. 
 
17 Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 50. 
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peoples’ individual content, anyone can see how communication on these platforms becomes 
more polarized and less informative as social media misguidedly panders to users’ political 
natures and amplifies a message’s aspects of social affiliation rather than information. 
The results of social media’s blunder into humanity’s political agenda effect both the way 
users post content and the way users receive content, specifically regarding news, its perceived 
validity, and how sharing news on social media changes that perception. In 2016, the American 
Press Institute and The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research conducted 
the Media Insight Project in which they created an experiment, testing for the effect sources have 
on the perception of content. The experiment surveyed a sample of nearly 1,500 people, 
presenting each person with the same news article but labeled as either a reputable news source 
or an unknown one and then shared by varying public figures—half of the people receiving a 
source they verified as trusted prior to the survey and the other half receiving a source deemed 
distrusted. Ultimately, the experiment found that “whether readers trust the sharer, indeed, 
matters more than who produces the article or even whether the article is produced by a real 
news organization or a fictional one.”18 For the majority of surveyors, the study found that the 
sharer of the article heavily impacted various aspects of trust in most cases (fig. 1). 
                                                
18 David Sterrett, Dan Malato, Jennifer Benz, Liz Kantor, Trevor Tompson, Tom Rosenstiel, Jeff 
Sonderman, and Kevin Loker, “Who Shared It?: Deciding What News to Trust on Social 





More importantly, the cases in which the sharer and news source most differed—a trusted sharer 
and unknown source or a distrusted sharer and reputable source—follow this trend as well, 
strongly reinforcing the conclusion that who shares content often outweighs who wrote it in 
impacting viewer perceptions.  
 
Fig. 2 
Not only does the account responsible for sharing the information affect how others perceive its 
qualities of validity, trustworthiness, and fairness, but the sharer also influences the way an 




The data from the survey confirms the dominant prioritization of social-political affiliation on 
social media platforms over actual information and objectivity of content. Just as social media 
capitalizes on the sensationalism and emotional engagement of photography, it also preys on 
similar aspects found in social affiliation. With a system founded on likes, comments, followers, 
subscribers, and social authority, these platforms successfully decontextualize and reframe 
content within relational boundaries—as if agreeing or disagreeing with a post implies 
subscription or denial of the person sharing it and the political and social groups they associate 
with. However, social media not only encourages the socialization of content, but actively 
curates the way in which it occurs, entrenching society further into a dysfunctional discourse 
characterized by polarization and self-serving bias.  
 This process occurs through social media’s dogged pursuit of user attention and habitual 
use, as platforms—most notably Facebook and Google—reward content that appeals to a 
person’s social affiliations while gradually filtering out other content. Author and technology 
activist, Eli Pariser, refers to this phenomenon as the “filter bubble.” As users reward certain 
sites, groups, friends, and links by sharing, liking, or commenting on them, Facebook uses a 
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scoring system that evaluates the content a person engages most with and works to provide them 
with more, while narrowing down on information that garners less user engagement.19 As a 
result, peoples’ news feeds tend to homogenized over time, showing less about people and 
organizations that a person disagrees with and providing more content from sources that a person 
supports and agrees with. Google also uses an algorithmically altered system when producing 
search results and advertisements based on 57 signals of information about the user—from what 
computer they are using, to where they are sitting, to what browser they used to open Google.20 
Social media already encourages tribal, membership-oriented behavior and communication 
merely in the design of its medium, so the additional, hidden concept of creating a filter bubble 
for its users dramatically heightens the problems encountered in internet discourse and modern, 
public conversation. According to Pariser, the problem also continues to spread through other 
sources as news sites such as the Washington post, retail-based sites like Amazon, and other 
media-consumption sites such as Netflix all utilize algorithmic gatekeeping to condense peoples’ 
entire online experiences into bubbles of relevant, easily digestible information.21 As society 
approaches a world that increasingly panders to each person’s biases, attempting to provide 
people with only what they want to see and hear, people see less of what they actually need and 
less diversity of thought. The result is a divided society, unable to properly engage in discussion 
or argument as social media reduces communication to the performative support of 
sensationalized content that aligns with a user’s already-held beliefs and ideologies.  
 
                                                
19 Eli Pariser. “Beware Online ‘Filter Bubbles,’” (TED: 2011).  
 
20 Pariser, “Filter Bubbles.” 
 
21 Pariser, “Filter Bubbles.” 
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The Panopticon 
 Beyond discussion of these realities of social media and human nature—that place 
society on track to fulfilling Huxley’s prediction of an over-stimulated, deadened existence in 
Brave New World—the socialization and over-sharing of information not only cheapens users’ 
lives, but also exposes them to unparalleled surveillance. While Huxley may have closely 
predicted the tendencies of consumers in a pleasure-driven world, the rise of the internet and 
social media sites leaves equal opportunity for the fulfillment of an oppressive, Orwellian future 
as well. The shift between these two dystopian models equates to the shift in how social media is 
utilized—shifting from the user-driven, information-sharing aspects of early stages to the 
institutional-driven, information-using aspects of later stages.  
“Social networks and media indicate and incorporate the shift to interpersonal, horizontal 
and mutual communication and offer the ability to increase information aggregation. 
Being “subjects in communication” users make their data available to others, thus 
becoming “objects of information” and therefore “objects of surveillance.”22 
What began as Brave New World threatens to become 1984 as these platforms encourage users to 
share visibly and construct an entire, digital identity that publicly and algorithmically leaves 
behind traces, concerning a person’s interests, affiliations, opinions, beliefs, habits, family, and 
friends. While people usually communicate online with a specific, narrower audience in mind, 
“social media augment their users’ visibility, not only to their chosen “friends” but also to other 
                                                
22 Manuela Farinosi, “Deconstructing Bentham’s Panopticon: The New Metaphors of 
Surveillance in the Web 2.0 Environment,” TripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. 
Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 9, no. 1 (2011): 62–76.  
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persons (as “friends” of “friends”), agencies, and institutions.”23 From the examples of people 
losing their jobs, public figures rising and falling, and the implementation of government and 
institution agendas all because of posts, photos, tweets, videos, and links—society is beginning 
to notice the most pervasive surveillance system ever created.  
 From Jeremy Bentham’s original designs for a revolutionary prison and Michael Foucault’s later 
development of the idea in Discipline and Punish, the concept of the “Panopticon” helps address the 
nature and full extent of social media’s threatening surveillance capabilities. The architectural plan of the 
Panopticon comprises a circular building—with fully visible, prisoner cells lining the circumference—
while a surveillance tower resides in the middle, using various means such as shutters to prevent visibility 
of the watchmen inside. The conceptual effect of the Panopticon, as described by Foucault, induces “in 
the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” 
as the structural design establishes a sustaining power relation in which the inmate is always “a subject of 
information, never a subject of communication.”24 This model of self-sustaining, surveillance-based 
power rests on two core properties: “the internalization of discipline in the mind of the observed and the 
voluntary subordination of individual to the observer’s potential gaze.”25 By combining the inmates’ 
vulnerability of unceasing exposure and constant ability to see the entity responsible for surveillance—but 
without the ability to verify whether or not surveillance is actually occurring—the Panopticon creates 
self-subscribed surveillance. Using a similar model, social media platforms provoke users to constantly 
submit self-generated content and personal information, willingly subscribing themselves to a world of 
                                                
23 Miltiadis Kandias, Lilian Mitrou, Vasilis Stavrou, and Dimitris Gritzalis, “Profiling Online 
Social Networks Users: an Omniopticon Tool,” International Journal of Social Network Mining 
2, no. 4 (2017): 293.  
 
24 Michel  Foucault, “Panopticism,” in Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated 
by A. Sheridan, (New York: Vintage Books: 1995), 195-228. 
 
25 Farinosi, “Deconstructing Bentham’s Panopticon,” 2. 
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digital publicity, exposure, and surveillance. Additionally, the internet fosters an environment of social 
exposure and has slowly eased society into the acceptance of surveillance and nonchalant assumption that 
everyone will likely be monitored, while hiding who exactly performs the surveillance and the motives 
for doing so. Social media and the internet have dangerously revolutionized the Panopticon model by 
lulling its ‘inmates’ into blissful apathy—simultaneously creating “novel surveillance tendencies via 
behavior and sentiment detection and prediction” and accessing information “without respect for social 
norms of distribution and appropriateness.”26  
 The inquiry still remains as to how this digital Panopticon utilizes its surveillance, what parties 
serve as the surveyors of social media users, and what are the consequences of this system. Of all 
platforms, Facebook most exemplifies the Panopticon model and has led the way in data mining and 
collecting user information—for the original purpose of targeted advertising and ultimately making a 
profit. However, as the platform grew and fed off the collection of past data, the prediction of future data, 
and manipulation of user experience to achieve these predictions, Facebook accumulated a staggering 
aggregate of personal information and power. Regarding agents of surveillance, Facebook exposes its 
users to constant scrutiny under three parties: commercial and political entities, other Facebook users, and 
government powers.27 The commercial value of Facebook originates largely from its “social graph”—the 
combination of users’ geographic locations, the content of their posts, biographical data, their records of 
interactions and engagements with posts and other users, and even user activity from other apps and sites 
that connect to Facebook.28 Facebook’s social graph and collection of data on over two billion users, their 
interests, and predicted behaviors gives the platform an unparalleled, commercial power over competitors, 
allies, users, and even legal entities.  
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The social network has also opened the door to new depths of social and peer-based surveillance. 
As people lose their jobs over risky photos or comments made online, post content that exposes the 
behavior of others, tag people in photos or posts, live-stream their day, harass, bully, stalk, and more—
each user lives under perpetual social scrutiny from both friends and strangers, turning the everyday 
individuals a person interacts with into the tower of the Panopticon. The frightening pinnacle of this 
reality, the People You May Know feature on Facebook, urges people to grant Facebook access to their 
address books for ease of transferring information which shares the personal information of countless 
other people who have no way of opting out.  
“Those email addresses and mobile phone numbers served as identifiers to Facebook profiles. 
And because Facebook’s social graph traced connections among profiles, the People You Know 
feature had the ability to connect people who were quite distant, estranged, hostile, or even 
violent toward each other. Because no user could control what information lies in another’s 
address book, no user could opt out of the feature. Users are at the mercy of other people and 
their understanding of how Facebook uses personal information.” (Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial 
Media, 58.) 
Now imagine an online platform possessing access to every email address, phone number, and 
home address of both users and even people without an account, along with their recorded interests and 
predicted behaviors, utilized by a strong, authoritarian government. The embrace and adaptation of social 
media resources by government entities has been coined “networked authoritarianism” by author Rebecca 
Mackinnon—describing the modes by which governments such as China, India, and Russia have kept 
tabs on their populations while also censoring and manipulating content.29 In several cases (discussed 
later), State use of Facebook, WhatsApp, and GroupMe has led to the oppression of specific 
demographics, tracking of journalists and dissenters, spread of propaganda, stifling of rival movements, 
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and infiltration of factions.30 Foucault succinctly encompasses these realities in his belief that for a state to 
monitor and alter the behavior of its people, “all that was needed was ‘a gaze,’ an endlessly inspecting 
gaze” that would cause people to monitor themselves—and even each other in the case of social media—
effectively establishing power with little effort.31 
 A study in 2014, examining datasets collected from Twitter and YouTube, tested the ease at 
which an entity can accurately and algorithmically classify social media users based on uploaded content 
and found it both accessible and useful in both advertisement and personality profiling as well as behavior 
prediction. In light of the data, the study found it possible to accurately extract personal information from 
user-generated content—specifically related to users’ political affiliations and perceptions of authority—
and thus potentially useful in Panoptic activity, raising legal and ethical issues.32 As mentioned before, 
social media often reduces people to their social affiliations, but through the practices of predictive data 
mining and targeted profiling, these platforms reduce people even further into mere data points and 
algorithmic assumptions. As people become further classified under social, commercial, and political 
frameworks—with friends focusing on performative actions, companies paying for predicted buying 
patterns, and campaigns investing in algorithmically tracked behaviors—society risks placing the data 
used to profile people above the actual people.  
“In a micro-social level, data mining of social media content may lead to extended 
discriminations and prejudice against persons and groups.” A visible risk to consider is 
the possibility for discrimination in the workplace: Online social media profiles, blogs, 
                                                
30 Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 61. 
 
31 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977, edited 
and translated by Colin Gordon, (New York: Pantheon Books: 1980), 155. 
  
32 Kandias, Miltiadis, Lilian Mitrou, Vasilis Stavrou, and Dimitris Gritzalis, “Profiling Online 
Social Networks Users,” 2. 
 
	 26	
tweets, and online fora are increasingly monitored by employers searching for 
information that may provide insight on employees and prospective hires.”33 
The internet and social media has revolutionized the Panopticon, creating a surveillance-entity 
that not only utilizes a central authority and fixed self-participation, but an additional system of 
peer-based surveillance and user-participation that actively increases over time.  
Why Do We Use It? 
 The simple answer as to why people continue to gorge themselves on social media: it 
gives people what they want. Social media does not try to change peoples’ minds or give a 
deeper understanding of issues. These platforms simply create a world—browsable, easy to 
understand, tailored to users, agreeable, sensational—and people happily accept it because 
ironically people feel safest and most in control while blinded to reality. Social media did not 
invent human tendencies and how to exploit them, it merely innovated the field and effectively 
capitalized on existing, core traits of human reasoning.  
 In 1979, Stanford conducted an experiment in which a group of students—half in favor of 
capital punishment, believing it to have a deterrent effect on crime, and half opposed to the 
practice, believing it to have no effect on crime—were chosen to respond to two different 
studies.34 One study provided data in support of capital punishment and the deterrence argument 
while the other provided data in opposition of this argument, but the researchers had fabricated 
both studies, designing them to present equally persuasive data and arguments. The experiment 
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yielded two-fold results: the students first evaluated the studies based on prior beliefs, rating the 
study that agreed with their view as more credible and convincing than the other, and ultimately, 
the supporters of capital punishment ended up further convinced of their view while those 
opposed were more adverse. Authors Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber address this subject of 
“confirmation bias,” the tendency of people to accept information that supports their beliefs and 
reject the information that contradicts them, by claiming that human reason’s main focus is not 
intellectual problem-solving, but navigating hyper-social environments.35 They refer to this as 
“myside bias” and propose that humans evolved to cooperate and socialize in ways other animals 
did not, but to survive in such a group-based environment, humans had to develop a natural 
protection of their own beliefs and social affiliations while developing a skepticism of others.36 
To test the effects of confirmation/myside bias, Mercier and Sperber performed an experiment in 
which people answered simple reasoning problems and then had the chance to look back over 
and change answers—only fifteen percent of which modified their responses.37 In the next and 
final step, participants reviewed one of the problems and received both their answer to the 
problem and the answer of another participant, with the chance to once again change the 
responses. However, the answers presented as someone else’s were actually their own and their 
own responses were someone else’s—a trick discovered by half of the participants, but of the 
other half almost sixty percent now found their own responses inadequate and rejected them. 
What may have once enabled humans to support themselves ideologically for survival and social 
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prowess now seems to subscribe society to the ploys of social media, the deconstruction of 
effective discourse, and the inability to reason. This mismatch is “one of the many cases in which 
an environment changed too quickly for natural selection to catch up.”38 
 Furthermore, humanity also enjoys living in a world where they know of many things, but 
little information about those things—people survive on a peer-based, knowledge system in 
which they rely on the knowledge of others to account for the unknowns of their own lives. 
Authors Steven Sloman and Philip Fernbach discuss this concept, “illusion of explanatory 
depth,” which states that people tend to believe they know much more than they really do, 
claiming it exists by division of cognitive labor.39 If asked to rate one’s understanding of devices 
such as toilets, zippers, and locks and then asked to describe the mechanics of the devices, 
people reveal the startling gap between their perceived knowledge and actual knowledge of the 
subjects.40 But despite these gross discrepancies in knowledge, people continue to live normally 
because while they might not understand how something works, someone else does and has 
designed it to operate with ease. Humanity rests on the natural, open boundaries between an 
individual’s knowledge and expertise and those of other people or the group as a whole—as 
people continue to live without knowing much but thinking they do and the people around them 
enabling this belief. Again, social media exacerbates this flaw in human reasoning, exponentially 
increasing reliance on the knowledge and content of other people and convincing people they 
have a good understanding of an array of diverse and serious issues. As public mediums of 
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communication begin to encourage the cultivation of falsely perceived knowledge on more and 
more topics, this causes trouble in political, religious, medical, scientific, and journalistic 
domains.  
“If your position on, say, the Affordable Care Act is baseless and I rely on it, then my 
opinion is also baseless. When I talk to Tom and he decides he agrees with me, his 
opinion is also baseless, but now that the three of us concur we feel that much more smug 
about our views.” (Elizabeth, Kolbert, “Why Facts Don't Change Our Minds.”) 
Though problematic, this reality brings pleasure and temporary fulfillment to users of social 
media. Subscribing to the rampant content of endless, online sources and an easily scrollable 
news feed, people can expand their perceived knowledge from encompassing daily activities and 
devices to more intense topics such as climate change, global politics, the science behind 
vaccination, and conflict in Syria. Social media makes it easier and more satisfying to live 
ignorantly, knowing of many things and never needing to know about them.  
 A final explanation for social media’s successfully captivating its audience lies in the 
natural, human desire for social affirmation from one’s own community. Going back to the 
origins of Zuckerberg’s social empire, visiting the concepts of his first sites HotOrNot.com and 
Facemash, reveals the foundation of Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter’s success. Combining the 
inconsistency of Skinner’s box and the self-participation of the Panopticon, HotOrNot.com 
achieved great success in 2001 which “showed Zuckerberg and many others that there was a 
significant number of people willing to subject their images to judgement and possible 
humiliation for the slight and sporadic reward of a signal of approval.”41 The process of 
HotOrNot.com resembled social gambling, with payment in the form of submitted photos and a 
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reward of affirmation, but soon Zuckerberg added an innovative aspect: socialness. While at 
Harvard, Zuckerberg created the site Facemash which took the core concept of HotOrNot.com, 
but took university photos of students from Harvard’s system, placed two side-by-side, and 
asked users to choose the more attractive one. “The impressive thing about Facemash was its 
rapid proliferation” as “its socialness made the service go beyond Zuckerberg’s control” and 
spread in a way that similar sites never achieved.42 Zuckerberg’s short-lived project proved that 
what makes social affirmation significantly more appealing is the ability to exchange affirmation 
with people you know, blurring the lines between your online and offline networks. People want 
to participate in the addictive, unpredictable, rewards-based system of social media—they crave 
endless, potato chip bites of feedback from the world around them—and this is exactly what 
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2. Destabilization  
“We Are Not Alone” 
 In the past decade, social media has proven a revolutionary, formidable force in 
mobilizing and empowering movements with not only the capability of widespread 
communication, but the capability to generate digital support that, in turn, gives the impression 
of tangible, offline action. However, often heralded by the Western world as vessels of 
democratic change and champions in the fight for freedom, internet access and social media 
often do not yield such results. These platforms succeed in merely amplifying the polarization 
and sensationalization of a movement—not in solidifying a cohesive voice that effectively 
persists beyond the movement. Because of how it focuses on shallow, emotionally compelling 
content, “Facebook is a powerful tool for motivation,” but “a useless tool for deliberation.”43 
Looking at the social media campaigns that propelled the success of ISIS and the 2011 Egyptian 
Arab Spring, one must set aside the democratic lens through which society often views social 
media and see how the use of these technologies promotes extremism and fails at achieving true 
democracy.  
 In arguing that social media sites promote chaos over democracy, the best place to begin 
is the phenomenon of ISIS’s success, exemplifying the way online communication fosters and 
breeds turmoil. With the aid of social media, ISIS has recruited over 30,000 foreign supporters 
from 100 countries, established branches in several other countries, publicly declared war on the 
United States, and choreographed gruesome videos for digital distribution.44 “The self-styled 
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Islamic State owes its existence to what the internet has become with the rise of social 
media—a vast chamber of online sharing and conversation and argumentation and 
indoctrination, echoing with billions of voices.”45 ISIS even launched their military invasion 
of northern Iraq with the online campaign, #AllEyesOnISIS, which used Twitter, Facebook, 
and a separate, smartphone app to document the group’s victories and shocking atrocities 
along their way to the city of Mosul.46 After a campaign of indiscernibly false and real 
stories—documenting the apparent crumble of Iraq and fabricating the strength of ISIS—the 
forces of 25,000 heavily-equipped Iraqi soldiers surrendered Mosul over to only 1,500 ISIS 
soldiers. Media prowess has fueled the intense expansion and growth of ISIS between 2013 
and 2014 and led to degrees of victory and intimidation that seem to lie outside the reach of 
the group’s actual capabilities. However, their success does not come primarily from 
particular, internet savvy, but from social media’s success itself—ISIS merely needed to 
conform its narrative to fit the design of these platforms.  
 By aligning its narrative closely with the many ways, as previously discussed, in 
which platforms like Facebook grip users’ attention, elicit emotional response, and fabricate 
a false reality, the Islamic State capitalizes on the same, exact strategies. Ultimately, this 
leads to the formation of; 
“a centralized narrative, but a diversity of voices is used to spread the interlinked stories 
and messages supporting it. There are, however, some apparent contradictions in the 
narrative when looking at some IS messages. On the one hand you find images and 
accounts of mass-graves, beheadings and seized territory with deterring messages like 
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“oppose us and we will behead you or crucify you” embedded in them. But on the other 
hand you also find “hearts and minds”-like imagery and messaging depicting social 
activities like delivering food to combat areas and other community work and IS´s 
apparent love of cute kittens.” (Nissen, Thomas E. “Terror.com - IS’s Social Media 
Warfare in Syria and Iraq.” Military Studies Magazine, 2014, 3.) 
ISIS follows the Zuckerberg model: an indistinguishable feed of diverse sources, shallow and 
sensationalized content, an emphasis of visual imagery, and inconsistent feedback that keeps an 
audience pressing the lever. The group’s mission shifts between ideologies of stability and 
savage chaos—a twofold strategy of bringing order to regions of anarchy and disorder to regions 
of stability. This seemingly paradoxical vision to unify all of Islam through practices of 
destabilization and division actually embodies Twitter and Facebook’s approach to unifying a 
world full of divisive, contradictory opinions and content within their platforms. Leading jihadist 
theorist Abu Bakr Naji, urges the Islamic State to break the West’s “deceptive media halo” and 
the American narrative of undivided stability, using “their own media capabilities that are able to 
provide the truth.”47 While Western society and the creators of this technology often wish to 
view social media as an agent of democracy, the truth differs immensely—chaos and subversion 
thrive on social media at the expense of freedom.   
  Social media’s role in the Egyptian revolution, during the 2011 Arab Spring, offers 
another exemplary case in which this technology succeeds in garnering motivation, but 
ultimately fails in fostering deliberation or stability. The revolution began with the brutal, public 
beating of Khaled Said at the hands of police in 2010. While an event such as this might 
                                                




normally disappear under cover-ups and further corruption, the mass publication of photos and 
videos on social media made disappearance impossible. In 2011, over eight million Egyptians 
used Facebook, over one million used Twitter, and within the first week of the revolution users 
had viewed nearly nine million YouTube pages.48 Though the triggers of the revolution varied, 
social media seemed to quickly accelerate its effects and became the medium of uprising. One 
activist notably stated, “We use Facebook to schedule protests, Twitter to coordinate, and 
YouTube to tell the world.”49 After thirty years of corruption, serious cases of oppression, 
rampant issues, and protests in 2006 and 2008, President Hosni Mubarak finally stepped down 
after eighteen days of continuous protest in 2011 and “the answer seemed so simple: 
Facebook.”50 Famous activist and Google employee at the time, Wael Ghonim, helped run the 
Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said” which served as a platform for collective unrest and 
transformed the potential of protest. Social media grants a level of accessibility, ease of use, and 
mobility that quickly lowers the barriers of communication and organization and as Ghonim 
once claimed; 
“it basically gave us all the impression that ‘wow, I’m not alone,’ there are lots of people 
who are frustrated. There are lots of people who are frustrated. There are lots of people 
who share the same dream.” (Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 129.) 
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Just as social media digitally amplified the meager forces of ISIS into a seemingly massive army, 
these platforms helped catalyze the Egyptian protests by convincing its supporters of its 
momentum, of a tangible and critical mass strong enough even to oppose an authoritarian 
regime. Ghonim once told CNN, “this revolution started on Facebook,” however; it did not end 
in freedom.51  
 A military regime quickly took over in 2013 and now a brutal, authoritarian dictatorship 
holds power once again. After the revolution in 2011, the movement stalled out, attempting to 
organize elections and a new government, but never achieving cohesive or lasting authority. 
Protests and revolutions have been occurring throughout all of history—some succeeding and 
some failing—and while social media has the ability to accelerate the process and amplify the 
sentiment that “we are not alone,” it merely fooled the world into thinking that Facebook and 
Twitter support democracy. These platforms are most effective in destabilizing regimes rather 
than building them. Once the protest movement took power, it was no different and fared no 
better against the chaos of social media. In 2015, Ghonim withdrew his previous sentiments, 
casting a new light on the events of 2011 by stating; 
“the euphoria faded, we failed to build consensus and the political struggle led to intense 
polarization. The same tool that united us to topple dictators eventually tore us apart. 
Social media only amplified that state by amplifying the spread of misinformation, 
rumors, echo chambers, and hate speech. The environment was purely toxic. My online 
world became a battleground filled with trolls, lies, and hate speech. I started to worry 
about the safety of my family.” (Shearlaw, Maeve. “Egypt Five Years on: Was It Ever a 
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'Social Media Revolution'?” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, January 25, 
2016.) 
The Illusion of Social Media Revolutions 
“Twitter revolutions” and “Facebook revolutions” have been reoccurring over the past 
decade, most notably in North Africa and the Middle East, and the world continues to excitedly 
abandon nuance in favor of exaggerated, over-excited interpretations of social media’s role. 
Protestors took to the streets of Tehran in 2009, but regardless of the fact that protests had 
regularly arisen in Iran, American media framed the situation as more about social media and 
less about political strife simply because protestors had begun using Twitter. As often 
overlooked by news coverage, Twitter mostly resulted in miscommunication and misinformation 
as 140-character messages inadequately expressed the movement’s depth and suspicious 
accounts began spreading false information as well. The movement’s social media presence 
garnered international support, but in the form of “slacktivism” which “describes such feel-good 
but useless internet activism” as showing solidarity through Facebook groups, sharing tweets, 
and exchanging messages of virtual support.52 Global media activism at best capitalized on 
unproductive, self-serving opportunities and at worst became harmful to the actual movement. 
The digital movement ironically ended when American Twitter users attempted to help Iranians 
attack government web sites and accidently disabled the entire Iranian internet along with 
protestors’ ability to use social media for further organization and planned protest.53  
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Additionally, the entire narrative of a social media-inspired Arab Spring began in 2011 
with the Tunisian protests, but this movement ended up rising and falling in a way the Egyptian 
one did just a few years later. Two years after protesting forced out the Tunisian president, the 
movement lost traction and the country fell once more into tumultuous, political conflict and 
restlessness—now facing new protests and an uncertain future.54 With the failure of social media 
to remedy the complex, deeply rooted conflicts of Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, and the entire Arab 
Spring movement, one must ask why Western media drags this technology into the spotlight. The 
tired, reused narrative of social media’s democratic benevolence is simply ignorant, narcissistic, 
and wrong. It presents a merely endearing theory, “dreamed up and advanced by cyber-utopian 
Western commentators, who finally got a chance to prove that billions of hours that humanity 
wastes on Twitter and Facebook are not spent in vain.”55 When these revolutions occur, Western 
media jumps at the chance to argue that Western technology and inventiveness are saving the 
rest of the world—completely undermining the actual historical context and political depth of 
these movements, the issues they face, and the failure of Western media platforms to do anything 
but exacerbate the problems. However, when the reality of social media’s appetite for 
destabilization hits the Western world, its media finally begins to see the problem and understand 
the gravity of the situation. 
Brexit and The 2016 Election 
 Interestingly, the recent, political influence of social media has adopted a less favorable 
light from Western media as the chaos of Facebook and the internet has begun impacting 
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Western democracy, notoriously affecting the outcomes of Britain’s decision to leave the EU and 
the United States’ 2016 presidential election. After years of investigation, one still cannot say 
with certainty the degree to which social media swayed a decision in these cases, but its 
involvement undoubtedly had an effect and the implications warrant concern. The story involves 
several major parties: Aaron Banks, Robert Mercer, Alexander Nix, the company Cambridge 
Analytica, its parent company SCL, Global Science Research, the company Eldon Insurance, and 
two Cambridge researchers. But, there exists one major force which ties them all together—
Facebook and the power of data.   
 In 2013, Dr. David Stillwell, Michael Kosinski, and Aleksandr Kogan were conducting 
research at the Psychometric Centre at Cambridge University based on the OCEAN model of 
psychometrics which consists of five core, personality traits, accounting for the initials of the 
model’s name.56 Using this system, researchers place a subject somewhere in the matrix of these 
five traits based on collected data samples and use the results to generate predictive models of 
behavior. However, finding people to consistently participate in extensive questionnaires 
presented a problem, pushing the Psychometric Centre to the revolutionary use of Facebook data 
“through the development of the ‘MyPersonality’ online quiz.”57 The online app seemed 
harmless enough as part of a growing trend in personality quizzes, but it granted researchers 
access not only to the participants’ answers, but to other online data, including a user’s likes, 
shares, and posts on Facebook. The researchers claimed that by “referring to as few as 68 
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Facebook ‘likes,’ they were able to predict with a high degree of accuracy a number of 
characteristics and traits, as well as other details such as ethnicity and political affiliation.”58  
At this time in 2014, Facebook’s lack of data security presented an extremely troubling 
reality—the platform allowed app developers access to both the data of users who actively 
agreed to participate as well as the data of their Facebook friends who had no say in this access. 
Hoping to capitalize on this rampant access to information, the company SCL, which engages in 
political consulting and owns the company Cambridge Analytica, approached the researchers 
about licensing the app and model. While Stillwell and Kosinski declined, Dr. Kogan offered his 
help. Once SCL acquired the model, Cambridge Analytica and Kogan renamed the app 
“thisisyourdigitallife” and set up a new company Global Science Research which implemented 
the app and simultaneously shared all collected data with Cambridge Analytica—estimated to 
include information on up to 87 million global, Facebook users.59 The app harvested information 
about a user’s profile, news feed, date of birth, current residence, tagged photos, liked pages, 
posted content, email addresses, and similar information pertaining to their Facebook friends as 
well. Dr. Kogan explained that the answers to the app’s survey, combined with this additional 
information, provided Global Science Research with a data model, able to “predict how the user 
was likely to vote.”60  
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 Two years later, the CEO of Cambridge Analytica Alexander Nix gave a presentation, 
“The Power of Big Data and Psychographics,” in which he boasted about the power of 
psychographic profiling and even made the claim that; 
“by having hundreds and hundreds of thousands of Americans undertake this survey 
[they] were able to form a model to predict the personality of every single adult in the 
United States of America.” (Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 151.) 
By no coincidence, Steve Bannon—who served on the board of Cambridge Analytica—stepped 
down in 2016 to aid the failing Trump campaign and brought with him the help of CA’s 
technology. After Trump’s victory, Nix followed up with another weighty claim that the 
company’s “revolutionary approach to data-driven communication has played such an integral 
part in President-elect Trump’s extraordinary win.”61 Bankrolled by billionaire, conservative 
Robert Mercer, connected through Steve Bannon, and informed by the work of Aleksandr 
Kogan, Cambridge Analytica had found a way to inform Trump’s presidential campaign and 
profit from its success.  
 Regarding the Brexit decision, Cambridge Analytica once more entangled itself in a data-
driven web of companies and political interests, involving the Leave. EU campaign, the United 
Kingdom Independence Party, Arron Banks, and the company Eldon Insurance. The Leave. EU 
campaign and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) both served as the forefront in 
supporting Britain’s decision to leave and have denied employing CA or the use of its data in any 
capacity. However, Brittany Kaiser—former head of business development at Cambridge 
Analytica—claims “the fact remains that chargeable work was done by Cambridge Analytica, at 
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the direction of Leave.Eu and UKIP executives, despite a contract never being signed.”62 A 
series of internal emails between CA and the political groups, submitted to Parliament, has 
outlined a relationship that supports Kaiser’s claims and conflicts with the groups’ denials. 
Additionally, Arron Banks—co-founder of the Leave.EU campaign—has expressed varying 
degrees of involvement with the data analytics firm, stating, “when we said we’d hired 
Cambridge Analytica, maybe a better choice of words could have been deployed.”63 Regardless, 
these political groups merely point to the fact that no formal contract exists and no payment 
occurred for data services, but higher management from both sides and whistleblower Chris 
Wylie from CA’s research team have all confirmed the use of Cambridge Analytica’s data by 
Brexit campaigns. Another aspect of data misuse lies in Eldon Insurance, an insurance company 
owned by Banks and accused of sharing customer data with Banks’ other venture Leave.EU via 
private email accounts.64 Though still unclear, the report submitted to Parliament details that the 
general weakness of Eldon Insurance’s control over customer data has allowed for its access by 
Leave.EU staff on many occasions.65  
Once again, powerful, wealthy individuals have used their companies to connect and fund 
campaigns in a matter that borderlines the dealings of a criminal syndicate, but the instances of 
Brexit and the 2016 Trump campaign present a new dimension—the unethical use of social 
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media’s data. Ironically, when the connection between these campaigns and Facebook first came 
to light, Western media vigorously fed the flames of the story, pursuing a dramatic narrative that 
presented Cambridge Analytica and its data as the secret, swing vote that directly put Trump in 
office and pushed the UK to leave. While discussing the political situations of the Middle East, 
North Africa, Asia, India, etc., Western media poses social media platforms as a gateway to 
democracy, but when they interfere in North American and European politics—social media 
becomes a calculating, unethical means to undermining the democratic process. And if media 
pundits always reported this second, darker reality, they would be correct in doing so.  
The politicization of social media—breaching, collecting, and profiting off users’ data for 
the purpose of targeted campaigning—represents a deeply manipulative process that reduces 
human voters to data points within models of predicted voting behavior. While the implications 
these practices have on the future of democracy and campaigns raises serious concerns, 
Cambridge Analytica merely represents the beginning and the actual impact of its involvement 
remains largely unknown and largely overstated. In the aftermath of this data-incited panic, the 
story has slowly tempered out into a more realistic vision as the story’s central figures, Nix, 
Cambridge Analytica, Banks, and others have revised their previous, bold statements. Political 
scientist David Karpf explains the reality of the situation and its wake of media panic, stating;  
“Targeted advertising based on psychometrics is conceptually quite simple and 
practically very complicated. And there is no evidence that Cambridge Analytica has 
solved the practical challenges of applying psychometrics to voter behavior. The simple 
explanation here is that Cambridge Analytica has been engaging in the time-honored 
Silicon Valley tradition of developing a minimum viable product, marketing the hell out 
of it to drum up customers, and then delivering a much more mundane-but-workable 
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product. The difference here is that Cambridge Analytica’s marketing has gotten caught 
up in our collective search for the secret formula that put Donald Trump in the White 
House.” (Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 156).  
As the dust settles and the accumulated boasting, panic, misunderstanding, and misrepresentation 
comes to a halt, the situation takes a more focused but equally alarming perspective—big data 
has become the new, political consultant. Peoples’ data extends far beyond them, reaching 
audiences and leaving traces that are unpredictable and unknown. When this data falls into the 
hands of social media platforms, insurance companies, retail companies, internet browsers, 
location services and any party willing to pay for it, the need for firms like Cambridge Analytica 
and corporate syndicates disappear. The problem lies in Facebook’s deception, its unethical 
breach in collecting and sharing data, and the power that comes with this exploitation. Facebook 
and its competitors continue to amass and analyze unparalleled amounts of information that 
pertain to the largest, global community of users ever created—all while society panics over 
smaller, paper tigers and occasionally fines Facebook after the damage is already done. In short, 
social media undermines democracy and becomes increasingly influential and dangerous as 
society heads towards a data-dominant world in which political victories are won digitally.  
Russian Propaganda and the 2016 Election  
 When discussing the effect of social media on democracy and the 2016 election, one 
cannot avoid the topic of Russian propaganda, the history of Russian misinformation campaigns, 
and how the country has revolutionized its tactics by utilizing social media platforms. Russia’s 
influence on the 2016 presidential campaign has been a widely discussed topic since it first 
surfaced, but there still remains a significant degree of uncertainty regarding its effect on the 
election’s outcome and how it managed to undermine the election’s democratic process. 
	 44	
According to Alex Stamos, the chief security officer of Facebook at the time, Russian 
interference in the electoral process consisted of approximately $100,000 in ad spending from 
June 2015 to May 2017—“associated with roughly 3,000 ads” connected “to about 470 
inauthentic accounts and pages… affiliated with one another and likely operated out of 
Russia.”66 Facebook also released a white paper in which they detailed the organized, disruptive 
misuse of the platform, stating; 
“the vast majority of ads run by these accounts did not specifically reference the US 
presidential election, voting, or a particular candidate. Rather, the ads and accounts 
appeared to focus on amplifying divisive social and political messages across the 
ideological spectrum—touching on topics from LGBT matters to race issues to 
immigration to gun rights.” (“An Update On Information Operations On Facebook,”) 
Russia’s social media presence took various forms including, fake accounts, shared content, 
divisive posts and comments, organized events, groups, and advertisements. The primary offense 
occurred through Russia’s capitalization on Facebook’s Unpublished Page Post advertisement 
service—which offers ad space within the flow of users’ news feeds for a low cost but with high 
effectiveness, ease of use, and visibility. Other activities include instances in which Russians 
orchestrated purposefully divisive situations such as the case in May 2016 when two Russian 
Facebook pages organized opposing rallies in front of the Islamic Da’wah Center of Houston.67 
                                                
66 “An Update On Information Operations On Facebook.” About Facebook, November 7, 2019, 
https://about.fb.com/news/2017/09/information-operations-update/. 
 
67 Claire Allbright, “A Russian Facebook Page Organized a Protest in Texas. A Different 





The page United Muslims of America hosted a “Save Islamic Knowledge” rally for the same 
place and time as the separate Russian-controlled page Heart of Texas hosted the event, “Stop 
Islamification of Texas.”68 For $200 worth of ads, Russians pitted Americans against one another 
in a farcical protest/counter-protest situation on the streets of Houston by simply posting on 
Facebook from computers in St. Petersburg. By analyzing the sample of 3,000 ads released by 
Congress, one can observe how Russia has effectively utilized Facebook to revolutionize the 
efficiency, affordability, and ease at which disinformation campaigns can spread divisiveness 
and polarization without any clear, cohesive message at all.  
The Heart of Texas 
 With the help of fellow peers—Ari Hayaud-Din, Molly Dishman, Morgan 
Christiansen, and Remi Gambino—I have conducted research on a sample of Russian 
advertisements from the 2016 presidential election to further reveal evidence of social media’s 
influence on public discourse, democracy, and individual, user perceptions of political issues. 
This case study serves to outline the ways in which the social media platforms have 
revolutionized the concept of propaganda and the ability of parties to curates extreme, divisive 
discourse on a large scale. This study serves as a form of quantitative content analysis, seeking to 
reveal whether the operations of the Russian intelligence on social media during 2015 and 2016 
align with traditional definitions of propaganda, push divisive issues, and take a side in the 2016 
U.S. presidential election. The research proceeds with the inquiry of these issues through 
developing a codebook that tests advertisements for the definition of propaganda, looks for the 
presence of divisive issues, and evaluates whether the ad campaigns present presidential 
candidates in a positive or negative light. The included ads derive from a publicly-available 
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folder of over 3,000 ads purchased by Russian Facebook accounts and released by the House 
Intelligence Committee in Congress. We chose advertisements according to the fulfillment of 
two criteria: whether Texas-related pages, such as the Heart of Texas page, created and posted 
the ads and whether the ads occurred between July of 2015 and December of 2016. Out of the 
total population of over 3,000 Russian ads that Congress released, 62 met each of these criteria 
and thus comprised the sample.  
The resulting data concerns the cost, content, influence, partisanship, and divisiveness of 
the ad campaigns. The 62 ads ultimately reached a total of over 567,340 people, with an average 
of 14,547 impressions per ad. The total amount of money spent to reach that many people was 
$5000.69, resulting in an average cost of $80.66 for the bought ads. Regarding imagery and 
content, 61 out of the 62 advertisements contained an image and only one of those 61 images did 
not have text in conjunction with the image. Furthermore, a specific motif throughout the ad 
campaign that manifested itself during research was the employment of a call to action. 23 ads 
called for Texas and its residents to succeed, 10 advertised a tangible event and promoted the 
attendance of it, and 19 of the ads prompted further interaction with the post in the form of a like, 
share, comment, etc. Concerning partisanship, only 6 ads mention Clinton or Trump, but all 
present negative attitudes towards Clinton and the three that mention Trump contain positive 
attitudes towards him. Lastly, research determined that 42 of the ads contained divisive issues 
(specific categorization of the issues found in the table below) and exhibited the qualities of 





Table 1. Amount of References to Potentially Divisive Topics 
References to: # of ads: % of total ads:  
Islam 14 22.5 
Christianity 7 11.3 
Guns/2nd Amendment 25 40.3 
Secession 23 37.1 
Terrorism 13 20.9 
Barack Obama 7 11.3 
Police/Policing 4 6.4 
Race/Black Lives Matter 2 3.2 
Immigration 5 8.1 
 
Russia’s Facebook campaign redefines propaganda and disinformation tactics by utilizing 
a new context that flourishes from sensationalism and rivalry rather than merely supporting one 
side. The advertisements largely concern divisive issues rather than public figures—
understanding that to undermine the democratic process, the inability to have public discussion 
or relate to opposing parties is more significant than fueling candidates’ rivalries. Additionally, 
the ads often present multiple perspectives on each issue, as in the case of competing anti and 
pro-Islamic rallies in Houston, rather than throwing support behind one argument as propaganda 
normal does. Though generally supporting Trump, the Russian campaign makes a point of 
focusing less on candidates and one-sided opinions because Russia’s goal is not to convince the 
American public of a single candidate or argument’s validity, but to undermine the ability to 
deliberate entirely. With the help of Facebook, the campaign also succeeded in revolutionizing 
the efficiency of distributing misinformation. While local television ads may cost a few thousand 
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dollars to air and national ads reach into the hundreds of thousands, Russia’s ad campaign used 
62 ads at an average rate of $80 per ad to reach an audience of nearly 600,000 people. 
Additionally, Russia’s ad campaign successfully exploited Facebook’s tendency to amplify 
strong, emotional content, using the majority of ads to pinpoint divisive issues that will garner 
the most user reactions and comments. In 14 ads that reference Islam, 13 refer to terrorism as 
Russians capitalize on the rewarded radicalization of ideas by Facebook and discuss non-
negotiable, polarizing topics such as secession rather than informed voting or legislative reform. 
The focus of both Facebook and the Russian ad campaign does not include providing a better 
understanding of issues or giving a realistic look at both sides in order to foster constructive 
discussion. Facebook’s model encourages people to overreact to shallow, misunderstood pieces 
of information—and Russia simply adapted their campaign to fit this model. Facebook has 
essentially lowered the barrier of entry for its content both financially and regarding quality, 
allowing for this ad campaign to reach a large audience at low cost. In short, the Russian ad 
campaign utilizes a combination of imagery and shallow polarization to engage social media 
users and prompt them to take any further action apart from constructive understanding or 
deliberation. By calling for extreme action, these ads propose succession rather than compromise 
and sensationalize issues such as the “fight against terrorism” as opposed to encouraging 
compromise, informed voting, and realistic views of the issues. Facebook and social media 
platforms not only encourage campaigns of propaganda and disinformation—they actively 
revolutionize them.  
Russia’s Disinformation Playbook 
 Throughout the past century, most notably during the Cold War, Russia has engaged in 
the practice of “active measures,” an innovative approach to global, intelligence operations that 
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social media has since modernized and other countries have begun to learn from and utilize as 
well. “Unlike the classic espionage, which involves the collection of foreign secrets, active 
measures aim at influencing events—at undermining a rival power with forgeries, front groups, 
and countless other techniques.”69 The history of Russia’s active measures consists of endless 
KGB-led, disinformation campaigns, all using false information to corrode the factual reality of 
historical events and any reliable sense of truth surrounding them. The key to Russian 
disinformation lies in the dissemination of false information into foreign media, letting rumors 
spread at their naturally prolific rate, while the truth plays a slow game of catchup. In the 1960’s, 
Soviet intelligence operatives spread rumors that the United States’ government played a role in 
the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. and also circulated a forged letter during the 
Vietnam War that documented the existence of American bacteriological weapons.70 Later in the 
1980’s, the KGB attempted to undermine Reagan’s run for presidency, even popularizing the 
slogan “Reagan Means War!” but the most notorious case of Russian disinformation is the rumor 
that the American government created the AIDS virus at Fort Derick, Maryland.71 The falsified 
story, “AIDS may invade India: Mystery disease caused by US experiments,” launched a 
lengthy, disinformation campaign—that only until recently has been fully exposed and still has 
millions of people believing in the hoax—as it surfaced through an obscure, Indian newspaper 
Patriot. Similarly, the newspaper responsible for first publishing the Russian, forged letter 
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during the Vietnam War was the Bombay Free Press Journal. Russian disinformation campaigns 
thrive on planting falsified information all over the world and publishing through unverified, 
unknown sources, often in developing countries, until the news story resembles a rumor—
information known by the world, but without anyone knowing where it came from originally.  
 As the internet and social media further destabilizes public discourse and democracy, 
they conveniently empower and reimagine the efforts of Russia’s “active measures,” 
encouraging other parties to take note of and utilize similar methods as well. While Russia once 
used news sources all over the world, notably controlling “10 Indian newspapers and one news 
agency” to plant 5,510 false stories in 1975 alone, the KGB no longer depends on these 
resources.72 With current media platforms, every account, post, link, article, video, comment, and 
URL becomes a potential host for disinformation. Anyone can create a fake, online news source 
and employ countless, online profiles to share the link and react to the content until the story has 
fully dispersed into the public domain, inevitably convincing a number of users to believe in a 
complete hoax. Facebook and Twitter have encountered thousands of fake, Russian accounts, 
advertisements, and posts and there appears no current end in sight as the problem becomes 
internal.  
“During the midterm elections in the United States last year, most of the false content on 
its site came from within the country itself” as “many of the misleading messages focused 
on voter suppression, with the company deleting almost 6,000 tweets that include 
incorrect dates for the election or that falsely claimed that Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement was patrolling polling stations.” (Sheera Frenkel, Kate Conger, and Kevin 
Roose. “Russia's Playbook for Social Media Disinformation Has Gone Global.” [The 
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New York Times, January 31, 2019], 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/technology/twitter-disinformation-united-states-
russia.html.) 
Additionally, while Russia and the targeted, American users themselves flooded the election 
process with rampant, online disinformation, other countries began executing their own version 
of this new, active measures playbook. “Armies of volulnteers and ‘bots,’ or automated profiles” 
have moved “propaganda across Facebook and Twitter in efforts to undermine trust in 
democracy or to elect favored candidates in the Philippines, India, France, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and elsewhere.”73 Earlier this year, Twitter gave a report, stating that countries 
such as Venezuela and Bangladesh have been using social media to spread government 
propaganda and Facebook reported that Iran had launched a disinformation campaign, targeting 
topics such as the Syrian conflict and 9/11.74 Social media has played a large role both in 
interfering with political campaigns, as in the cases of Brazil, Venezuela, and India, and in 
shaping public discourse on a global scale through efforts like the Iranian government’s 
disinformation campaign. The world seems to have descended into a chaotic state, filled with 
false information and sources that barrage society both from the outside and inside.  But, there 
remains two sides to the coin. While much of this paper has shown the ability of social media to 
destabilize weak governments, undermine institutions of power, and disrupt public discourse, 
there remains an alternate reality—the ability of social media to strengthen authoritarian 
governments and enforce regime-specific propaganda.  
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3. Authoritarianism and Social Media 
“Networked Authoritarianism” 
 During the early stages of the internet’s rise and the creation of social media, Western 
idealism and the misinformed efforts of Western media led to a persistent belief that the 
introduction of internet and social media use to the world will naturally result in democracy and 
liberation—but over the past decade this idealistic prediction has proven baseless and incorrect. 
Just before the internet age, Ronald Reagan famously stated, “the Goliath of totalitarianism will 
be brought down by the David of the microchip”—a view later supported by Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton’s view that global, internet freedom would strip authoritarian leadership of 
information control and empower the public. However, as seen in the previous cases of 
destabilization, just because social media allows for or bolsters something does not mean social 
media guarantees it. Social media may provide mediums for political movements to undermine 
authority, but it does not guarantee their success. Additionally, these platforms may allow for 
public control of information, but they do not guarantee this freedom—a detail quickly noted by 
powerful governments and regimes across the globe. The world often views the internet as if it 
represents Excalibur—a mighty sword granted specifically to those in need of its power and only 
to be wielded by those it chooses—but ultimately, internet access is just a sword, a weapon 
available to anyone who knows how to utilize it. And naturally, the stronger, more organized, 
and better equipped parties will likely pick up this sword more quickly and utilize it with greater 
deftness than the ill-prepared and disorganized ones. Social media gives the public a voice but 
gives authority the power to stifle it.  
 As the world progresses further into the internet era, methods of surveillance and control 
continue to expand and innovate, shifting from previous notions of standard, outright censorship 
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to more complex systems of precise control that go largely unnoticed. Authors Ron Diebert and 
Rafal Rohozinski categorize the methods of modern, state-initiated control into three 
“generations.”75 The first generation of control represents an earlier model in which the state 
implements broad denial of internet services, blocks certain domains and servers, and publicly 
filters and sifts through online information. The second generation seeks to establish a legal 
environment that legitimizes practices of censorship and filtration, providing ways for the state to 
deny or remove certain information when it becomes necessary and justify both overt and covert 
control with the mere appearance of law. Differing from the first two generations, the third 
consists of a multi-dimensional approach that focuses on utilizing the internet and competing 
with oppositional parties in order to publicly and systematically crush them as opposed to simply 
denying them access. Society entered the online era, worrying mostly about the first generation 
of informational control—cautious of the stereotypical, early-Chinese approach to denying 
access broadly and strictly while also surveilling the internet manually and extensively. 
However, authoritarian and state powers have begun primarily using second and third generation 
controls with shocking and aggressive innovation and China, the state that once notoriously 
depended on firewall-type control, appears to lead the way.  
 China has revealed to the world how exploitation of the internet and online platforms— 
when approached with nuance, skill, and preemptive action—proves most effective in 
undermining opposition without invoking further resistance. In discussing China’s revolutionary 
approach to online control, Rebecca MacKinnon coined the phrase “networked authoritarianism” 
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to describe “when an authoritarian regime embraces and adjusts to the inevitable changes 
brought by digital communications technologies.”76 As regimes adapt to the internet and social 
media, they exploit these resources in five major ways.77 They organize counter-movements in 
response to emerging protests. They use superior technical expertise and resources to shape 
public discourse and frame online conversation. They stage social media as a place for the public 
to voice dissent, without allowing for actual appeal or protest processes. They use public figures 
and elites to garner support for the regime. And most viciously, they use social media to track, 
harass, and discredit journalists, activists, and reformist movements by using propaganda and 
falsified information. The theory behind networked authoritarianism consists of engagement 
rather than restriction—refuse to play the game and the opposition will dissent but learn to play 
in order to crush the opposition and people will accept it as part of the game. Within this 
approach;  
“the government follows online chatter, and sometimes people are even able to use the 
Internet to call attention to social problems or injustices, and even manage to have an 
impact on government policies. As a result, the average person with Internet or mobile 
access has a much greater sense of freedom – and may even feel like they have the ability 
to speak and be heard – in ways that weren’t possible under classic authoritarianism. At 
the same time, in the networked authoritarian state there is no guarantee of individual 
rights and freedoms. People go to jail when the powers-that-be decide they are too much 
                                                
76 Rebecca Mackinnon, “Chinas ‘Networked Authoritarianism.’” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2 
(2011), 34. 
 
77 Vaidhyanathan, Antisocial Media, 187. 
	 55	
of a threat – and there’s nothing anybody can do about it.” (Mackinnon, Rebecca. 
“Chinas ‘Networked Authoritarianism,’” 3-4)  
The subtlety of networked authoritarianism has allowed varying parties all over the world 
to frame public discussion, spread propaganda, suppress dissent, and maintain power while 
providing a façade of freedom and democracy to placate the public. Regimes have found success 
by curating open dissent in China, spreading disinformation in Russia, avoiding full, journalistic 
pressure in India, and publicly undermining opposition in Azerbaijan. In contrast to widely held 
notions of Chinese censorship and strict internet access, social media in China is characterized 
by a steady source of public protest. Events such as the death of Sun Zhigang and the Xiamen 
protests represent instances in which the Chinese public takes to social media—raising their 
voice, reporting misconduct or corruption, and criticizing government action—and the 
government actually takes proper measures to meet the public’s demands.78 Complete denial of 
discussion would incite full protest, but carefully mediated discussion avoids this problem while 
still not granting any significant power to the public’s voice. The Chinese public can discuss 
certain political issues, raise demands, and even influence certain areas of government policy, 
but in way that will only maintain the authoritarian regime—through placation of the public—
rather than upheave it.79 In describing this practice, Baogang He and Mark Warren have coined 
the term “authoritarian deliberation” to explain the way that a strong government can use internet 
‘democracy’ to stabilize authoritarianism.80 By reframing the way public discourse and social 
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media can bolster a regime, China’s strategies have spread and taken new forms as other 
countries have also begun to adapt to the internet age in hopes of maintaining their authoritarian 
rules. 
 As internet access and social media use began rising in the country of Azerbaijan during 
the early 2010’s, the government—already characterized by strictness, censorship, and fear—
adapted to the new mediums of public discourse in a way that not only allowed for opposition, 
but publicly competed with it. The Azerbaijani adaptation of networked authoritarianism first 
began in 2009 with the arrest of Adnan Hajizada and Emin Milli. In the years before their arrest, 
the young men had helped form youth, activist groups and built a social media presence, 
culminating in 2009 when they posted a “donkey rights” video on YouTube. In the video, they 
criticized the Azerbaijani government and joked that a donkey had more rights than an 
Azerbaijani citizen. Two weeks later, the two men faced arrest and over the following months, 
the “donkey blogger” arrests became a symbol: an example that hovered over the heads of the 
population. After the arrests, there occurred a significant drop in activist support, further proving 
the core principle of networked authoritarianism—“the government would not have been able to 
instill this fear had it merely censored Milli and Hajizada.”81 “Only by making the internet open 
could they reach the frequent internet users who had become a source of consternation,” and use 
the competitive, online environment to “punish some people and let everyone else watch” as if to 
say “this is what can happen to you.”82 Following the events of the Arab Spring, the Azerbaijan 
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government made a considerable effort, using high-profile arrests and linking social media use 
with public oppression, to frame online platforms as an anxiety-ridden arena where one has 
much to lose and little to gain.  
Katy Pearce conducted extensive research on Azerbaijani media between 2009 and 2011, 
testing for correlations between media use and public opinion/interest in politics. She found that 
while social media use in Azerbaijan rapidly rose during those years—similar to the rising trends 
found in Iran, Egypt, and Tunisia—the use of online media for political purposes did not rise. 
From 2009 to 2010, the percentage of Azerbaijani citizens who believed that protests helped 
assert the public’s power over government fell from 53% to 27% while the percent of internet 
users who disagreed with online protests rose from 38% to 70%.83 Pearce discovered that while 
internet trends and user behavior showed consistency and paralleled other countries, 
experiencing similar digital environments, support for protests and political dissent fell in 
relation to an increase in internet usage. Additionally, among the social media users interviewed 
by Pearce, one estimated that out of 100 online activists at the time 50 stopped using social 
media and 30 became ambivalent after the arrests of the “donkey bloggers.”84 While China 
adapted to social media by allowing for carefully regulated dissent, Azerbaijan preemptively shut 
down online, political activity by making an example out of it—by choosing its opponents 
deliberately and ensuring their public downfall.  
Russia and India have also experienced regressions into authoritarianism through the use 
of social media under the respective regimes of Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Modi. In St. 
Petersburg, there exists a company called the Internet Research Agency which employs hundreds 
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of people to create and spread disinformation through online platforms. The Russian government 
currently pays employees to utilize social media in an effort to advance government interests, 
both foreign and domestic, by undermining the trust, democracy, and institutions of other nations 
while undermining opposition, dissidents, and unfavorable journalism back in Russia. Putin’s 
regime even employs state-sponsored, propaganda news sites such as Sputnik and RT which feed 
“journalistic” material to the digital, disinformation campaigns, creating a system in which the 
state controls both the sources of information and the accounts sharing the information. Using 
similar tactics, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under India’s current prime minister Narendra 
Modi, has benefited greatly from the propaganda-filled, extremist-inciting nature of social media 
and achieved historic, majority control in Parliament. With a history of violence, nationalism and 
attempts to rewrite India’s multi-ethnic history, both the BJP and Modi represent hateful, anti-
Islamic, anti-liberal sentiments. This caustic history has made Modi and the BJP party ideal 
figures for garnering motivation and achieving success on Facebook.85 Through propaganda 
campaigns, they have incited anti-Muslim movements, inspired voter support, favored BJP 
policies, and attacked the reputations of opposing journalists and activists—all under the radar of 
actual journalism and international bodies. Social media makes it easy for the public to consume 
propaganda and engage in harassment and intimidation, but hard for authoritative, regulatory 
bodies to find, assess, and remove that information from such a restless sea, filled with crashing 
waves of false, absurd content.  
The Irony of “Free Basics” 
 In 2013, Facebook launched the Internet.org initiative in which the company partnered 
with several large telecommunications and software companies to work towards global, internet 
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access. By 2015, the service became available through the platform “Free Basics” which sought 
to provide a free, holistic internet experience for developing and rural regions around the globe 
by offering a select list of stripped-down, ‘essential’ websites—all centralized within a user’s 
Facebook account. The service amounts to online services—relating to education, health care, 
messaging, weather, news and more—all provided with no data charge through the central 
platform of Facebook. The Free Basics program has reached 60 countries, but encountered grave 
consequences in many, resulting in the service’s silent discontinuation in several developing 
countries and the concern for its future in others. While Zuckerberg states that his vision for the 
program centers on providing affordable, world-wide internet access to help empower, inform, 
and connect people, the reality is much more capitalistic and bleak.  
Ultimately, as a for-profit company, Facebook constantly looks for new opportunities to 
gain users and increase its influence and the Free Basics program presents a perfect way to enter 
massive, emerging markets like India and potentially increase Facebook’s network by billions of 
people. So, regardless of the vision, suddenly offering a walled-garden, internet experience—that 
is specifically controlled and used through Facebook’s social media platform—to 
overwhelmingly media-illiterate populations can yield horrifying results. “The most concerning 
issue with Internet.org has been its unpreparedness to serve and protect the people it is helping 
come online for the first time” as it “is shaping the internet experience of users—i.e. the services 
they can access, the services they cannot access,” and creating “a filter bubble for users that 
influences their worldview.”86 The program has abruptly ended in Bolivia, Papua New Guinea, 
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Trinidad and Tobago, Republic of Congo, Anguilla, El Salvador, Myanmar, and Saint Lucia and 
an another dozen Latin American countries will discontinue use as well.87 This paper has largely 
documented the many ways that Facebook and social media platforms deteriorate effective 
means of communication and journalism—instead rewarding false, hateful, extremist content and 
propaganda. So, imagine what happens when the digitally illiterate, majority of a country first 
experiences internet entirely through Facebook, the platform’s content, users’ news feeds, and 
Facebook-directed websites.  
To observe the harmful effects of introducing social media-centric internet use in 
developing countries, one must first look at the recent horrors that have taken place in Myanmar. 
After nearly a half century of military regimes, Myanmar began transitioning into democracy and 
free elections within the past decade, but experienced a major setback when Facebook introduced 
Free Basics in 2016, shortly after mobile phone companies and the government first introduced 
rampant adoption of mobile phones. Country-wide adoption of mobile phones was paired with 
the adoption of Facebook, resulting in the Burmese population’s belief that there exists little to 
no distinction between Facebook and the internet. And just as social media has helped Russia 
and India regress into authoritarian modes of communication and governance, the Free Basics 
program inspired a covert, military campaign in Myanmar. Similar to how Modi and the BJP 
used Facebook in bolstering their nationalist identity and spreading anti-Muslim sentiments, the 
military-backed, Buddhist nationalists used Facebook operations to inspire an ethnic cleansing 
and genocide of the Muslim Rohingya minority. The military’s Facebook operation began years 
ago and occurred as follows; 
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“They began by setting up what appeared to be news pages and pages on Facebook that 
were devoted to Burmese pop stars, models and other celebrities, like a beauty queen 
with a penchant for parroting military propaganda. They then tended the pages to attract 
large numbers of followers… Those then became distribution channels for lurid photos, 
false news and inflammatory posts, often aimed at Myanmar’s Muslims, the people said. 
Troll accounts run by the military helped spread the content, shut down critics and fuel 
arguments between commenters to rile people up. Often, they posted sham photos of 
corpses that they said were evidence of Rohingya-perpetrated massacres… One of the 
most dangerous campaigns came in 2017, when the military’s intelligence arm spread 
rumors on Facebook to both Muslim and Buddhist groups that an attack from the other 
side was imminent… making use of the anniversary of Sept. 11, 2001, it spread warnings 
on Facebook Messenger via widely followed accounts masquerading as news sites and 
celebrity fan pages that “jihad attacks” would be carried out.” (Paul Mozur, “A Genocide 
Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar's Military.” The New York Times, 
October 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-
genocide.html.) 
By conjuring sentiments of fear, confusion, and hatred while posing violence against a 
minority group as the solution, the Buddhist, military campaign merely followed in the footsteps 
of history’s countless, authoritarian leaders. However, this time no one stood behind a podium, 
delivered a speech, or wrote a manifesto, they simply used Facebook. Eventually, the company 
became equipped to properly translate and filter out hateful, offensive posts and in 2018, 
Facebook decided to remove the Free Basics program entirely from Myanmar. However, such 
unprepared, unintelligible entry into a developing country—blindly creating a county’s entire 
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internet experience out of sensational, Western technology with no consideration of political and 
cultural contexts—meant that from day one of the Free Basics program, Facebook had done too 
little too late for Myanmar. By 2018, the anti-Rohigya movement had already forced nearly a 
million Muslims to flee the country and resulted in countless atrocities.  
Conclusion 
While this paper emphasizes the particularly innovative nature of social media, 
discussion of this technology falls within a larger conversation about media technology and the 
way that mediums of communication have constantly shifted the direction of world culture, 
human reasoning, and geopolitical climates. Consider how the printing press, radio, television, 
and internet have subsequently redefined the dimensions of a message’s range, depth, audience, 
and means of reception. Every medium capitalizes on similar motifs of sensationalism and 
dissemination—endlessly pushing the boundaries on how to reach a greater audience and how to 
demand even more of their attention. Dating back to the 16th century in Rome, Pietro Aretino 
publicly posted disparaging sonnets about political candidates, creating the “pasquinade:” a type 
of fake news that targeted public figures.88 This trend further developed into a genre known as 
the “canard” in 17th century France, consisting of Parisian journals that often produced gripping, 
but false information. The mass production of dubious, printed materials reached its pinnacle in 
18th century London when newspaper writers, known as “paragraph men,” reduced journalism to 
the practice of converting short blurbs of gossip and slander into segments of published news.89 
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The printing press revolutionized communication, but revealed how new mediums can exploit 
the flaws in humanity’s prioritization of sensationalism over truth and credibility. 
However, while innovations in media technology often capitalize on the vulnerabilities of 
human reasoning and consumeristic tendencies, the response rarely warrants complete denial of 
the medium and historically society finds a way to move forward. The printing press forged a 
new system of literature, journalism, and unfortunately, false information, but a response soon 
followed in the form of peer review—the checks and balances of academia. Society has 
consistently proceeded each form of communication, from the printing press to television 
broadcasting, with ways to regulate the information, categorize its content, and certify its 
credibility. The problem lies in how these technological innovations seem to jump far beyond 
human expectations, leaving society to adapt to what it has created—a reactive existence in 
which the problems always occur first and the solutions slowly follow. Such discussions of 
social media as presented in this paper do not serve as a call for its total abandonment or even 
hope to dampen the steadily rising rates of social media usage. The purpose of discussing this 
topic is to speed up the process by which humanity finally realizes the flaws in its technology 
and makes the effort to properly address them. Journalism, academia, literature, radio, and 
television all take root in systems of regulation and certification that demand transparency and 
integrity, yet rarely would someone regard this as impinging on freedom of speech or 
representative of government intervention. Yet, when discussing regulation of social media or 
the internet, the public often steers the conversation towards these stigmatized notions. A call for 
reforming social media represents a call to prioritize truth—to once again take control of the 
technology that the world has created instead of allowing it to drive the world further into 
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darkness. It makes more sense to light up a room before ever crossing the threshold rather than 
doing so after stumbling through the room’s entirety. 
Social media has opened the world to a dystopian future that does not just conform to 
either the authoritarian vision of 1984 or the desensitized reality of Brave New World, but rather 
combines the two within an unnerving, symbiotic relationship. Much of this paper discusses 
numerous, horrifying aspects of social media that fulfill the visions of 1984—a digital 
Panopticon-based existence in which authoritarian regimes and powerful companies have the 
ability to track every person’s information, communication, and behavior in order to manipulate, 
exploit, and oppress entire populations. Yet, not many people care. With the rise of the internet 
and social media, it appears most people have grown desensitized to and even expectant of data 
breaches and misuses, assuming companies like Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, etc. will 
simply use their information in unknown ways and not much can be done about it.  
The realities of 1984 only exist with the support of Brave New World. Just as the 
Panopticon relies on the mental self-subscription of its captives, social media relies on the 
willing participation of its users. As people bleakly ask themselves what can be done about social 
media, they continue to actively opt-in, provide these platforms with endless data, and sharpen 
the very sword that stronger entities wield against them. The trick lies in the numbness and over-
saturation of the internet era. People keep consuming digital media, entertainment, interaction, 
communication, journalism, and information that resemble potato chips in quality and substance. 
One loses track—eats a whole bag without noticing and still feels hungry—and continues to do 
so despite knowing that it is an unhealthy habit because a person does not see the immediate, 
tangible consequences, but rather consigns to facing them some other day. A person does not 
develop heart disease after one bag of chips—it takes incrementalism. People have grown 
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addicted to a system that inconsistently and sensationally rewards some users, punishes others, 
and leaves the rest to wait for the next, food pellet to drop. So while users may not witness or 
understand the damage being done to journalism, democracy, public discourse, race-relations, 
and notions of truth itself, they continue to blindly enable the system and incur the consequences. 
In the most troubling combination of fates, society has become apathetic to its own 
downfall and additionally, has lost hold of any baseline for truth. With social media, any opinion 
can become a fact—found, shared, liked, commented on, and supported by those who agree. 
Social media thrives on decontextualizing information and only taking the most dramatic, 
surface-level, reaction-provoking aspects which has resulted in several phenomena. These 
include the resurgence of the anti-vaccination movement, growth in the flat earth community, 
increase in propaganda, rise in authoritarianism, and empowerment of extremist groups like ISIS. 
In 1984, the protagonist faces torture at the hands of a regime that refuses to relent until he 
accepts that 2+2 can equal 5—that ultimately, the regime decides even the most basic notions of 
truth. However, social media has proven that convincing society 2+2=5 does not require torture. 
As long as someone believes 2+2=5 and has a place to support their belief with an illusion of 
visual, evidential support and a community of like-minded people, then, in effect, people begin 
to live in a world where 2+2 can equal 5. Social media may not have invented the common 
sentiment—a lie gets halfway around the world while the truth is still putting on its shoes—but it 
certainly capitalizes on the idea and has significantly contributed to creating a world in which 
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